AURM-NET
Mission-context assurance for degraded C2 and autonomous systems.
AURM-NET assesses whether commands, telemetry, custody transitions, PNT state, video state, RF confidence and autonomy state remain trustworthy under degraded conditions.
AURM-NET does not fly the system, issue commands, control routing or improve packet delivery. It provides assurance evidence and governed recommendations for authorised systems, operators and autonomy policies.
AURM-NET does not
improve delivery.
In full-stack simulation, HOLDFAST Core + Adapt produced the same mean C2 PDR as HOLDFAST Core + Adapt + Sentry + AURM — by design. AURM is not a delivery-improvement layer.
AURM-NET does
improve trust assessment.
AURM-NET's contribution is trust correctness, review signalling and false-trust prevention — assessing whether a delivered message and the broader mission state should still be acted on under degraded conditions.
Routing and cryptography are not enough.
A message can be validly signed and still be stale. A position can be available and still be inconsistent. A node can be present and still have broken custody. A command can be syntactically correct and still be mission-incoherent.
Transport
Routing moves packets.
Security
Cryptography verifies authenticity.
Resolvix
Is this message still fresh, custody-consistent, context-valid and safe to trust?
What AURM-NET evaluates.
Evidence
Command freshness
Temporal validity assessment for commands and command context.
Evidence
Custody continuity
Reasoning about node custody across partition, delay and rejoin events.
Evidence
PNT confidence
Positioning and timing confidence and detection signals.
Evidence
Video state
Video freshness, staleness and frame-confidence evidence.
Evidence
Telemetry confidence
Bounded confidence in telemetry channel state and content.
Evidence
RF confidence
Receiver-visible RF and link-state evidence abstracted from bearer telemetry.
Evidence
Mission context
Whether commands and state transitions remain coherent under the current mission state.
Evidence
Autonomy state
Whether the autonomy system itself is in a state consistent with the assurance evidence.
Evidence
Audit and provenance
Traceable evidence record for post-event analysis and operator review.
Trust outcomes, not trust scores.
AURM-NET produces specific assurance outcomes that operators and autonomy policies can act on — not opaque scores. Each outcome carries an evidence trace and a review signal where appropriate.
- TrustedTrusted mission success
- DegradedDelivered but review required
- DegradedDelivered but PNT insufficient
- DegradedDelivered but video stale
- DegradedDelivered but custody ambiguous
- PreventedDelivered but context invalid
- PreventedLate command prevented from false trust
SkyArray.
SkyArray is a related Resolvix concept for passive airborne RF sensing and trust-fused emitter awareness, providing confidence-scored RF situational evidence.
When mature, AURM-NET can consume SkyArray evidence alongside HOLDFAST, Sentry, PNT, video, telemetry and autonomy-state evidence. SkyArray is not part of the current launch product set.
AURM-NET is / is not.
AURM-NET is
- A mission-context assurance layer.
- Protocol-neutral where possible.
- Bearer-agnostic.
- Evidence-producing.
- Designed for degraded command environments.
- Designed to support bounded autonomy policies.
- Designed to integrate with existing systems.
AURM-NET is not
- A radio.
- A waveform.
- A GNSS receiver.
- An autopilot.
- A C2 platform replacement.
- A delivery-improvement layer.
- A weapons system.
- An operational control authority.
What AURM-NET does. What it does not.
What we do
- Assess command freshness and custody continuity
- Evaluate PNT, video, telemetry and autonomy-state confidence
- Combine HOLDFAST and Sentry evidence with mission context
- Produce operator-facing assurance outcomes and review signalling
- Prevent false trust in late, stale or context-invalid commands
- Support bounded autonomy policies under degraded conditions
What we do not do
- Fly the system
- Issue commands
- Control routing or radios
- Improve packet delivery rate
- Make autonomous targeting decisions
- Classify real jammers or attribute adversary behaviour
- Claim anti-jam or anti-spoof validation without field evidence
Simulation-backed. Hardware validation next.
Current state
Simulation-backed architectural prototype.
Next gate
M1 — live RF/GNSS ingestion, SDR or radio-adjacent evidence, hardware-in-the-loop replay, constrained-node performance, and partner-informed validation.
Not yet claimed
Field validation, RF validation, GNSS anti-spoof validation, anti-jam validation, SDR validation, waveform validation, operational deployment or combat validation.
Claim Boundary